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Since the founding of the United Nations and the establishment of the Security 
Council there have been no changes to the makeup of the permanent membership.  Indeed, 
with the exception of one amendment to increase the size of the rotating membership from 
six to ten the Security Council has continued unchanged.  In the fifty-plus years since the 
founding of the world body and the victory over the Axis Powers that served as the impetus 
for its creation, the world has changed dramatically.  The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
has ceased to exist; the Republic of China has been exiled to Taiwan and undergone 
remarkable economic and democratic changes; the British Empire has morphed into the 
Commonwealth and the French Empire has collapsed.  New states have come to the forefront 
to challenge the post-war status quo.  Some, like Egypt and India, were colonial possessions 
of the imperial powers.  Others, like Germany and Japan, were the defeated powers of the 
Second World War.   
Japan in particular has a unique economic, financial, political and military history that 
deserves special consideration as it relates to its ambition for a permanent United Nations 
Security Council position.   Furthermore, the motives and justifications for why it pursues 
such a seat and the opposition it has received deserve just as much attention.  This thesis 
traces the views of the leading figures in Japanese politics from the founding of the United 
iv 
 Nations to the present and demonstrates that from the beginning Japan realized that the UN 
was a legitimizing force for their new place in the new post-war world.  It also demonstrates 
clearly that lacking a clear definition of what a permanent UN Security Council contender 
looks like aspirant states are forced to create their own portfolios.   Therefore Japan relies 
heavily on its strengths as an undisputed economic and financial power.  Furthermore, it 
shows that despite strict Constitutional constraints on the use of the military Japan’s force is 
modern, well-funded and well-maintained.  Finally, it catalogues opposition to expanding the 
Security Council into three distinct categories and explains them in their modern geopolitical 
context. 
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 PREFACE 
 
I would first and foremost like to thank the staff of the Asian Studies Center for their tireless 
support on my behalf, and especially for their generous awards allowing me to conduct my 
graduate studies at the University of Pittsburgh without a single penny of my own spent.  To 
all the donors and the taxpayers who make that possible, my sincerest appreciation is due.   
 
Secondly I must thank the following individuals by name: Dr. Müge Finkel, the first 
individual to sign on to my thesis committee, who brings her expertise on the minutiae of 
Japanese politics to this endeavor; Dr. Donald Goldstein, my tireless advisor for this last year 
whose knowledge of Asian security has been invaluable and a constant inspiration in the 
direction this work should take; and, of course, Dr. Richard Smethurst, whose extensive skill 
in Japanese history will always dwarf my own. 
 
I would be remiss not to directly mention Dianne Dakis in the Asian Studies Center for her 
open-door policy, which, unlike the one in China not so long ago, is of her own free will and 
a constant source of goodwill and a good conversation.  I am also deeply indebted to Oshimo 
Junzo in the Japanese language office for his assistance in correcting my weekly assaults on 
his language and making the Japanese language translation portions of this thesis possible.  I 
of course must mention that faculty and staff of West Texas A&M University in Canyon, 
Texas, who gave me the skills and guidance necessary to embark on the path of Asian 
Studies.  In particular Dr. Paul H. Clark, himself a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh, 
who set me on this “adventure”. 
 
This work is dedicated to my family.  To my great-grandfather Harold Wayne Taylor, who 
fought in World War II and from whom I took the greatest part of my name; to my 
grandmother Helen Holmes and to my father Eric Holmes.  I am keenly aware that I owe 
them for where I stand today. 
 
With that, a few notes on the style of the Japanese language used throughout this work.  The 
author has used the Asian style of presenting names throughout the document.  The family 
name precedes the given name of the individual without regard to the individual’s historical 
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notoriety outside Japan.  Furthermore, all translations are the author’s own unless indicated 
in the citation. 
 
Finally, an explanation of the title is in order.  The title Calling Shotgun derives from the 
faux Old West phrase “riding shotgun”, but try as you might you will not find that phrase 
used once in the entire thesis.  As residents of the American southwest (such as the author) 
and English speakers around the world influenced by American popular culture are no doubt 
aware, to “call shotgun” is to claim the front passenger seat in someone else’s car.  Imagine 
that the United Nations Security Council is the driver’s seat of an automobile (either a classic 
Thunderbird or an Edsel depending on your viewpoint) and the permanent members are on 
their way to get in when Japan pushes past France, Britain, Russia and China, triumphantly 
shouts “shotgun!” and takes their seat by the driver.  “Sorry”, says the United States as it puts 
the key in the ignition and starts it up, “Japan called it first.  Besides, you’ve had it long 
enough, give somebody else a turn…there’s always plenty of room in the back”. 
Anthony W. Holmes  Calling Shotgun 
 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
In January of 2000 an official foreign policy team from Japan held an informal 
meeting with the Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China where it attempted, and 
failed, to gain support from China for Japan’s long sought after bid for United Nations 
Security Council Permanent Membership.  Responding to the outcome of the attempt, an 
unnamed foreign ministry official noted how ''difficult it is to gain sufficient public support 
for payment of its heavy 20 percent share of UN contributions when Japan's bid to become a 
permanent member remains unrealized''.1 
Indeed, since 19562 Japan has made various public statements and international 
relations “feelers” in an attempt to establish international support for its bid to become a 
permanent veto-wielding member of the United Nations Security Council.  Since the time 
when Japan first began its phoenix-like rebirth to prominence on the world stage, Japan has 
been seeking legitimacy for its new role in a new world. 3  To Japan, the United Nations 
Security Council is the prestigious embodiment of that legitimacy.  Since the founding of the 
United Nations, no new permanent members have been added to the Security Council.  This 
means that the only standard for permanent membership in the body is that you were a victor 
in the Second World War.  Of course, since the end of that war the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics no longer exists, the Republic of China was exiled to Taiwan and the British and 
French Empires have passed into history.  Yet these powers remain enshrined in the Charter 
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as the permanent five members, and no changes have been made to their official status.  Due 
to the lack of a commonly accepted modern standard for states seeking permanent 
membership on the Council, states are forced to design their own campaigns.  For Japan, the 
campaign is one which emphasizes economic and financial power, with a lesser emphasis on 
their post-war status as a pacifist state. 
If permanent Security Council membership is the pinnacle of international prestige 
and legitimacy, a certain sign of having attained and surpassed not only your regional 
neighbors but also all others across the globe, recognition that you have ascended to a 
position of unequivocal world prominence, then the logical place from which to examine 
how Japan fits into the current order is by comparing it against the permanent members of the 
Security Council.  Three accepted elements of national power: the economic, political and 
military strength of the nation will be used in this regard.  
Economically, Japan has very strong credentials for a seat on the UN Security 
Council.  Japan is assessed the second highest amount of mandatory payments for the UN 
regular operating budget behind only the United States of America, and donates more than 
any other nation to the voluntary budget for peacekeeping operations.  Japan donates billions 
of Yen annually in Official Developmental Assistance grants including aid to nations who 
already enjoy permanent membership on the Council.  Furthermore, in almost every instance 
Japan ranks higher in premier economic indicators than all other permanent members of the 
Security Council save the United States.  Japan is also a member of the group of eight nations, 
the so-named “G8” forum that brings together the leaders of the world’s largest economies to 
discuss matters related to international growth and development.  Economically, there is no 
member of the Security Council, permanent or otherwise, who could legitimately claim Japan 
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has no place in it. 
In military terms Japan has the potential to be a great power.  Despite Constitutional 
limitations, some would say a complete Constitutional bar, Japan has a very modern, well-
funded and well-maintained force that is non-military in name only.  Though Japan does not 
have standing force totals equal to other major powers it still has a larger standing force than 
one permanent member of the Security Council and is clearly capable of supporting a larger 
force should it be required, or mandated.  The restrictions on the use of these forces, and the 
longstanding political issues deeply scarring Japan’s national consciousness, are frequently 
mentioned by detractors both from within and without to prove that Japan is not ready for the 
burdens of international leadership that permanent council membership carries.  The 
resolution of this uniquely Japanese characteristic will be key to Japan realizing its goals, and 
also for easing the uncertainty Japan’s allies have towards the country’s ambitions. 
Japanese politics has been described as being driven by consensus and bureaucracy, 
preferring broad concessions to bold, individual leadership.4  Japan also possesses a 
parliamentary body designed along Western lines but quite dissimilar from anything the West 
is used to in terms of both style and substance.  This presents a clear predicament for Japan 
and the nations which support its aspirations.  Namely, whether Japan can be counted on to 
offer its support when global crises arise in a manner consistent with the extemporaneous 
needs of the moment.  Japan’s most notable encounter with such a situation, to be elaborated 
upon later in this analysis, occurred in the Gulf Crisis, later the Gulf War, of 1990-1991.  
This formula of government, coupled with an international body charged with reacting 
quickly to threats, has led some to question the efficacy of such a union.  Some politicians 
have been crying from within the framework of this system for changes, and as this relates to 
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the problems of Japan’s ambitions it will be explored, but the problem is much larger than 
this minor work can fully articulate. 
Japan does not exist in a vacuum, and as such it cannot separate its political 
aspirations from those of the rest of the world.  Japan does seek a permanent seat on the most 
powerful body in the United Nations, but others do as well.  These other states, such as 
fellow World War II phoenix Germany, South American giant Brazil, sub-continental tiger 
India, and successful Muslim states like Egypt demand what they see as better regional, 
ethnic, economic, historic and popular representation on the permanent membership on the 
Security Council.  The current “great five” jealously guard their positions, and are able to 
utilize the difficulty of amending the United Nations’ Charter to their advantage to maintain 
the status quo.  Aiding them in this is the undeniable fact that there has never been a mutually 
agreed upon definition of what constitutes a clear candidate for a new Security Council 
member, since there has never been an expansion of the permanent membership to set 
precedent.  Japan must, therefore, try her national oratorical skills in a completely new 
endeavor and win favor from a majority of the world’s states, as is necessary to amend the 
United Nations’ Charter at one stage, and her regional rivals, one of whom possesses a veto, 
at another. 
Opposition to expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council comes 
from many parts of the world and takes on many different forms.  The weaker nations of the 
present permanent membership adopt the argument that the Council currently acts well 
enough to represent whatever interests the newcomers are seeking to represent, therefore no 
reform is necessary.  The middle-tier regional powers, those that are somewhat influential in 
their neighborhood yet are not being considered for permanent seats, argue that reform is 
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necessary, but not by adding their regional rivals to positions of influence.  For the purposes 
of this analysis, this is useful in understanding the intense, targeted opposition Japan has 
received from every angle.  From Article Nine of the Constitution, to Japan’s inability to 
“atone” for past sins, to the undoubtedly political nature of the invective and scorn heaped 
upon Japan by her most powerful regional rivals, Japan is facing an uphill battle against 
entrenched opposition to attaining its goals.  Indeed, China hopes to use Japan’s strong 
security ties with the United States to undermine the country’s bid by playing up the image of 
the country as a deferential lap-dog, thereby giving the US a second veto and depriving the 
developing world of a voice it could have had in its place.  South Korea, despite its historic 
alliances with both the United States and Japan as a bulwark against communist aggression 
and Pacific security, has for the record stated that it will do everything it can to keep Japan 
from its ambition. 
In economic and financial terms there is no nation that could argue legitimately that 
Japan has no place on the Security Council.  Militarily there is no nation that could argue that 
Japan is incapable of fielding a force should it be called upon.  Politically, the situation 
becomes more uncertain.  The political restraints on the military, and the political structure 
itself, are the biggest liability the nation faces and are often used by detractors to counter the 
country’s strong economic position.  That is the primary reason that economic and financial 
matters are not come upon in the opposition Japan encounters on its road to ascension, rather, 
Japan’s rivals target the weak points of military and historical matters. 
This paper does not take a position on the suitability of Japan for a permanent United 
Nations Security Council position, nor does it argue that Japan’s contentions are without 
merit.  This thesis will trace the history of Japan within the United Nations in Part I, 
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demonstrating the rapid ideological change that the leadership demonstrated in its first few 
years as it realized the legitimizing force the world body was.  Then in Part II it will analyze 
Japan’s past, present, and potential future political and military situation to show the 
difficulties the nation faces from within and without on the way to fulfilling its ambition.  In 
Part III it will show the three types of opposition to expanding the Security Council the 
author has identified and catalogued, especially as they relate to Japan.  This information will 
be used to underscore the author’s main contentions, which are quite simply:  
1. Since the permanent membership has never expanded there is no standard by 
which to judge new aspirants, leading Japan and its fellow hopefuls to create 
and argue from their own strengths. 
2. These “strengths” are not universally acknowledged.  Some believe the new 
Security Council should be representative of the world’s regional diversity. 
Others, notably China, believe the expanded Council should take into account 
the developing world. 
3. Economically, financially, and militarily Japan “looks like” the present 
permanent members of the Security Council.  This becomes even more 
important as the traditional great powers continue their steady decline and 
new powers continue to emerge. 
4. Japan’s unique political and Constitutional situation provides a worrisome 
barrier for even its staunchest allies, like the United States. 
5. Finally, for all of Japan’s hopes and dreams of gaining absolution for its past 
China holds the keys to the Security Council through the veto, and one 
element of opposition, that which the author has termed “opposition from 
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history”, will not be overcome for it acts as a convenient tool of absolutist 
states to consolidate popular sentiment against Japan. 
Much work has been done in the past comparing Germany and Japan; their postwar 
recovery, their readmission into the international community, their historical memory, etc.  
This thesis purposefully breaks with such work in order to do a targeted, focused analysis on 
Japan and Japan’s unique political condition. 
To begin, an analysis of the roots of the United Nations Security Council and Japan’s 
history within it shall be presented, for it is impossible to explore Japan’s perceptions of a 
Security Council seat without first exploring its functions, powers, and associated 
responsibilities.  Therein lies the roots to the Council’s prestige in the Japanese perception.  
Furthermore, it is useful to understand the history of Japan within the world body and how 
Japan’s past informs its future.   
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2.1 The United Nations Security Council – Postwar Security Anachronism 
The United Nations was formed in the aftermath of World War II in an attempt to 
provide a forum for peaceful and multilateral decision making on issues affecting the world’s 
collective security.  It was hoped that the United Nations could serve; 
“To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” 5 
 
The General Assembly of the Security Council was designed to incorporate all 
member nations of the world into an egalitarian body which could collectively control the 
organization as well as monitor the world’s political situation.  The United Nations Security 
Council, on the other hand, was set up to be an exclusive body of five permanent members 
which represented the major victorious powers of the Second World War.  These nations, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Republican China, and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics were originally joined by six non-permanent members elected on a two-
year rotation. 6 
The Security Council has a unique design characteristic that lingers today as a 
reflection of the immediate post-war world.  All Security Council resolutions require a 
simple majority vote of the rotating members as well as the affirming votes of all five 
permanent members7.  This design, technically termed “great power unanimity” but more 
colloquially and commonly termed the “veto” power8, was built around the politics of the 
Cold War that appeared almost immediately after the end of the Pacific War.  It was 
concluded in policy circles that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and 
Anthony W. Holmes  Calling Shotgun 
Republican China, being the principle ideological allies at the end of the war, would 
dominate the council.  The Soviet Union, however, would have considerable influence 
through use of the great power veto to keep it at the table and grant the Security Council 
legitimacy.  The creation of the veto was in part a reflection of the ongoing turmoil in a 
world torn between Capitalism and Communism and the future of their states.  Since the 
Security Council is the only body which can theoretically force member states, through 
resolutions, to participate in military action it was agreed that unanimity would be required 
among all five permanent members9.  This design would keep turmoil limited to only the 
major communist versus the major capitalist worlds, while allowing the council to react 
unanimously against minor threats to the Cold War order from without. 
 Since the creation of the Security Council, it has always been the subject of debate for 
various de jure reforms which, with the exception of one proposal to increase the size of the 
rotating membership from six to ten in 196310, have ended in failure.  That is not to say that 
other, de facto, reforms have not taken place.  The Republic of China, the official name for 
Taiwan, had its seat on the council stripped by the United Nations General Assembly and 
granted to the communist People’s Republic in 1971.11  When the Soviet Union collapsed in 
1991 her permanent seat transferred to Russia12, though many elements of Russia’s prestige 
and power have gone the way of her breakaway republics.13  The world has changed quite 
dramatically since the days of the Cold War.  In some cases that change has been recognized 
by the world body.  In others, it has been ignored. 
2.2 Japan joins the United Nations 
 
  Japan was occupied by the United States from its defeat in 1945 until the restoration 
of sovereignty with the Treaty of Peace with Japan, popularly known as the San Francisco 
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Peace Treaty, in 1952.  In the preamble to the treaty itself, Japan declared its intention to join 
the United Nations; 
“WHEREAS Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in 
the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create within Japan 
conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the 
Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese 
legislation; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to 
internationally accepted fair practices”.14 
 
Although this public statement was made, Japan was unsure about the nature of the role the 
United Nations should play in the country’s future.  Some Japanese imbued the world body 
with an almost messianic quality, while others thought the UN would be so contentious an 
arena of world politics that Japan could not legally or morally involve itself within it. 
Soon after the various parties concluded the treaty with Japan, formally ending 
hostilities, the United States signed with Japan a treaty of mutual defense, obligating the 
United States to defend Japan in the future.15  With no defense budget to speak of, Japan was 
free to begin rebuilding its economy and infrastructure that had been ravaged by the war. 
 Even before Japan had its sovereignty restored with the peace treaty in 1952, as early 
as 1946 it had begun deliberations on joining the United Nations.16  As Drifte explains, a 
major point of contention in the Diet at the time was how to reconcile Article Nine of the 
new Constitution with various articles in the United Nations’ Charter relating to defense and 
war-fighting capabilities.  This will be important later when the issue of Peacekeeping 
Operations and military support is discussed.  To understand these issues it is necessary to 
understand Article Nine, which reads; 
 
 
Page 10 of 73 
 
Anthony W. Holmes  Calling Shotgun 
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and 
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of 
the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling 
international disputes.  
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized”.17 
 
Contrast this with Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations and an important 
dichotomy emerges.  Section one of the article states; 
“All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance 
of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the 
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or 
agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of 
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security”.18 
 
Drifte goes on to explain that many on the Left in Japanese politics “owing to their strong 
pacifism, were even doubtful whether Japan should get involved in the UN as an arena of 
power politics” at all.19 
 Japan eventually joined the United Nations in 195620, and the debate continued about 
the proper role Japan should play in the world body.  The eventual decision by the 
government was that Japan would discharge its duties related to UN membership “within 
[the] limits of Japanese law”21 and with “appropriate reservations”.22  When Japan formally 
applied for membership in the United Nations Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo wrote that 
Japan would meet its responsibilities “by all means at its disposal” acknowledging the 
limitations of Article Nine.  Interestingly enough, this was the same wording used when 
Japan first publicly announced its candidature for a permanent UN Security Council seat.23 
 Some in Japan were able to rectify the discrepancies between Article 43 of the UN 
Charter and Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution with their belief that in the future the 
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United Nations would have its own military forces, making their renouncement of the use of 
force, even in self-defense, appear principled and natural.24  Others, like Prime Minister 
Yoshida posited that Article Nine could be used in Japan’s favor in immediate terms by 
allowing Japan to pursue economic growth at the expense of any real self-defense 
capability.25  
Once Japan joined the United Nations, they immediately began work on restoring 
their prestige and place in the world community.  They also hoped they could reform the UN 
from early-on to bring it in line with their new position of economic power.  Within the UN 
framework, however, was a glaring reminder of Japan’s past that served as a psychological 
stumbling block to the future. 
2.3 Contention within the United Nations: 
The Enemy Clauses, Article Nine, and the Early Maneuvers 
 
Depending on how one chooses to define diplomatic normalcy determines how one 
views Japan’s current diplomatic situation.  With the possible exception of the Constitutional 
limitations on military force to settle disputes (“hard power”), Japan has the same sovereign 
rights as any other nation to independently negotiate solutions to outside issues and engage 
other nations on its own terms.  However, in the international community there is still a 
lingering remnant of the Second World War that serves to remind Japan of its previous 
period of humiliation and submission.  For Japan, removing this glaring reminder is a high 
priority. 
A particular sore point for Japan is what are collectively called the “enemy state” 
clauses in the Charter of the United Nations.  These clauses, articles 53, 77, and 107 allow 
the original signatories to engage in any necessary “enforcement action” against “any state 
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which during the Second World War [was] an enemy of any signatory of the present 
Charter”.26   Though some in Japan see these articles as null and void27  now that Japan is a 
full UN member, others remain adamant for revision of the clauses, calling it “a 
psychological issue”.28  
Government officials pay particularly close attention to the clauses and how they 
relate to eventually permanent membership.  A Japanese official stationed with the Japanese 
permanent mission to the UN in New York stated “the United Nations faces important 
reforms as the world enters the 21st Century. With the end of the Cold War, there must be 
changes in the 50-year-old structure as the needs of the world are different”.29 
Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who served from November 1982 until 
November 1987, once confided in his Foreign Minister: 
“Immediately when I became Prime Minister, I ordered the Gaimusho (外務
省 - Foreign Affairs Ministry)…[to] delete the enemy clause!  We have to 
become a permanent Security Council member!  I told the Gaimusho about 
these two ideas.  But the Gaimusho practically refused it.  Then [I ordered 
them to] delete the enemy clause first!  Consult with Germany about it, with 
[German Chancellor] Kohl, that is what I ordered the Gaimusho.  The 
Gaimusho did not really agree, and probably did not consult that much with 
Germany.”30 
 
More recently, at a speech before the General Assembly in 2005 Prime Minister Koizumi 
Jun’ichiro touched upon both issues again when he stated:  
“The world has changed dramatically over the last sixty years…Japan has 
determinedly pursued a course of development as a peace-loving nation, 
making a unique and significant contribution to the peace and prosperity of 
the world. 
The composition of the Security Council must reflect these fundamental 
changes.  Japan is convinced that Security Council reform is a just cause for 
the international community – as is the deletion of the long obsolete ‘enemy 
state’ clauses from the UN Charter.”31 
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In both these instances we see Japanese Heads of Government linking deletion of the 
enemy state clause with attaining a Security Council permanent membership, that is, we see 
diplomatic normalization linked with international recognition of Japan’s post-war power.  
For Japan, diplomatic normalization is not being seen as equal to other nations, diplomatic 
normalization is being a permanent Security Council member.  A primary step towards this 
goal is removing the residual “enemy clause” which still remains in the UN Charter to this 
day, though not for lack of effort on Germany or Japan’s part.  As recently as December 
2004 an advisory panel to then-Secretary General Kofi Annan reported the enemy state 
clauses “are outdated and should be revised” so that the Charter reflects “the hopes and 
aspirations of today, not the fears of 1945”.32  Three days before the report was issued, then-
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder met 
in Tokyo and agreed on the need to delete the enemy clause from the UN Charter.33 
As Japan worked toward reforming the UN Charter, they were also working on 
reforming the country domestically and internationally.  Successive Japanese Governments 
have taken different views of Japan’s role in the United Nations, many of which can be 
interpreted as early harbingers of Japan’s eventual desire for a permanent Security Council 
seat.  Over time, these objections changed from interpreting Article Nine as banning all use 
of force to banning only offensive force,34 eventually to allowing Japan to participate in 
Peacekeeping Operations.   
 Early on, the Japanese Government publicly and adamantly proclaimed that Article 
Nine effectively forbade Japan from defending itself.  This statement, made by Prime 
Minister Yoshida Shigeru in 194635, contrasts sharply with a statement he made just nineteen 
years later when he wrote; 
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 “For Japan, a member of the UN and expecting its benefits, to avoid support 
of its peacekeeping mechanisms is selfish behavior.  This is unacceptable in 
international society.  I myself cannot escape responsibility for the use of the 
Constitution as a pretext for this way of conducting national policy.”36 
 
Cooney explains that politicians in Japan did not try to amend the Constitution to 
realize their plans for progressive normalization of national defense and the Self-Defense 
Forces, but rather chose to reinterpret the meaning and intent of Article Nine as time passed 
to be in-line with their stated goals.37  This met with fierce resistance from the Left-wing of 
Japanese politics.38  Some officials even went so far as to discuss the possibility of 
possession of nuclear weapons in a purely defensive capacity as a deterrent. The government 
of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke proclaimed; 
“The Government intends to maintain no nuclear weapons, but speaking in 
terms of legal interpretation of the Constitution there is nothing to prevent the 
maintaining of a minimum amount of nuclear weapons for self-defense.”39 
 
Later, Kishi’s Government made an official statement where it further broadened the official 
interpretation of Article Nine; 
“In the event an attack is waged…and there are no other means of defense, 
counter attacks on enemy bases are within the scope of self-defense.  With the 
right of self-defense retained as an independent nation, the Constitution does 
not mean for the nation to sit and do nothing and await its death.”40 
 
 It did not take long for Japanese politicians to realize the legitimating power of the 
United Nations and the inadequacy of strict adherence to Article Nine in the evolving 
geopolitical climate.  This rationale is a logical stepping stone to Japan’s eventual belief in 
the constitutional legality of Peacekeeping Operations. 
 Before getting to widespread public agreement on the military and political nature of 
Security Council permanent membership, Japan had other rationales supporting its argument.  
Economically and financially Japan has very impressive credentials underlying its ambitions.  
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These two factors were much safer politically, both domestically and internationally, in 
driving for permanence, and were the first set out, and the most widely discussed, among 
advocates and opponents.  Since that is the case, it is now useful to compare Japan’s 
economic and financial power with the states Japan would like to sit alongside at the circular 
table. 
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3.0 Part II ­ The Present Environment 
 
3.1 Economic and Financial Power in Comparison 
 
Economic indicators are especially noteworthy when comparing Japan to the nations 
which currently serve as permanent members of the Security Council.  As discussed in the 
introduction, lacking a consensus on a clear definition of a permanent Security Council 
contender, nations are forced to design and argue their own definitions.  For Japan, the 
obvious argument is an economic and financial one.  This is where Japan stands strongest 
against the other contenders who are not yet permanent members but seek such a position, 
and where Japan can comfortably demonstrate its similarity to the present permanent 
membership in a wide variety of commonly accepted economic and financial indicators.  
Economically and financially, Japan can confidently argue it “looks” like a permanent 
member. 
Japan is a member of the “Group of Eight” or “G8” nations who meet annually to 
discuss major global “economic and political” issues.  Membership in this exclusive club 
includes, in no particular order, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Russia, and Canada.  Together these represent 66.5% of the world’s economy.41  
When specific indicators are ranked a pattern will begin to emerge. 
If Gross Domestic Product, the value of all goods and services from a nation in a 
given year, is analyzed the economic disparities between Japan and the other permanent 
members is evident.  According to the International Monetary Fund, the United States and 
Japan are securely in the number one and number two spot, respectively.  The United States 
far exceeds Japan, $13.7 trillion to $4.4 trillion, but Japan alone exceeds all other nations 
permanently on the Security Council.  The People’s Republic of China holds a GDP of $3.2 
Page 17 of 73 
 
Anthony W. Holmes  Calling Shotgun 
trillion, the United Kingdom $2.75 trillion, France $2.5 trillion, and Russia $1.2 trillion in US 
Dollars.42 
Nominal GDP is not always the best indicator of economic power or efficiency.  In 
such cases GDP by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is a useful value to consult.  PPP goes 
further than nominal GDP by comparing the exchange rates of different currencies and 
seeking to determine the relative value of each to buy a similar basket of goods in each 
country.  One dollar in the United States would buy considerably less than one US Dollar 
would buy in China.  PPP seeks to take this exchange into consideration when computing 
economic power and growth.  Again using the International Monetary Fund rankings we see 
a disparity between permanent Security Council members and their overall economic 
rankings.  The United States once again ranks first with $13.5 trillion US dollars, while this 
time the People’s Republic of China follows with $11.6 trillion, recognizing China’s rapidly 
modernizing and expanding economic power.  Japan is in third with $4 trillion while the 
United Kingdom is in sixth place with $2.3 trillion, France in seventh with $2 trillion, and 
Russia in ninth with $1.9 trillion.43 
 Economically, a real disparity exists between the world’s largest economic powers 
and those that serve as permanent members of the Security Council.  That disparity also 
extends to financial contributions.  As previously discussed, the Japanese have linked 
diplomatic normalcy with permanent membership.  In financial terms, their record of 
financial support to various diplomatic agencies and funds also underlies their normalcy and 
what they perceive the end result should be. 
Logically, it is easy to understand how a nation that pays huge sums of money to the 
UN Budget, voluntarily donates billions more to Peacekeeping Operations, and actively 
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engages in ODA grants and loans to developing states, would feel that its voice was being 
underrepresented at best, or ignore at worst, on what is arguably the most important body in 
the international community. 
Financial power stems from economic power, for the economy of a state must be able 
to produce the wealth that can be sent abroad.  Using both of these elements, Japan is a great 
power.  Japan contributes the equivalent of millions of dollars annually in assessed payments 
to the United Nations, both the Regular Operating Budget (ROB) and in voluntary payments 
to fund peacekeeping operations.  Japan also donates significant sums in grants and loans 
under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as Official 
Developmental Assistance (ODA) to modernizing states around the world.  In most every 
indicator of economic strength, Japan ranks at either the near top, or the top.  These factors 
are frequently referenced underlying rationales in Japan’s ambition. 
In terms of assessments to the United Nations ROB, Japan is rivaled only by the 
United States for total contributions to the United Nations as a whole.  Of the approximately 
$1.6 Billion United States Dollar regular operating budget of the United Nations in 2006, the 
United States was assessed $423.5 million, or 22% of the total budget.  Japan, the second 
largest contributor to the overall mandatory operating budget, was assessed $374.7 million, 
or 19.47% of the total budget.44 
 These amounts are striking, but they become even more so when they are compared 
to the contributions of other member states both permanent members of the Security Council 
and regular member states.  Starting with the other permanent membership, a clear and 
definite pattern begins to take shape. 
 Of the other permanent members of the Security Council, in terms of payments to the 
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UN ROB, the United States places first (as previously discussed).  From the pinnacle of 
mandatory payments the other permanent members drop off sharply.  The United Kingdom 
was assessed $104.6 million, or 6.13%, placing 4th overall; followed by France at $102.9 
million, or 6.03%, placing 5th; then the People’s Republic of China at $35 million, placing 
9th; then Russia, assessed $1.1 million, placing below Mexico, Canada, Italy, and even the 
Netherlands in total payments.  In fact, half of the mandatory UN assessed budget comes 
from the United States, Japan, and Germany, in that order, which pay approximately $946 
million, or 50.13% of the ROB.  The remaining four permanent members of the Security 
Council pay approximately $263.7 million, or 15.31%.45 
 These figures have not escaped the notice of the Japanese at all levels of society.  
Prime Minister Nakasone reportedly told a meeting of the National Research Committee that 
“Japan was the second biggest contributor to the UN and therefore had no need to be shy”46 
about their aspirations for permanent membership.47  Other officials in the Japanese 
government have reportedly stated “the country’s acceptance into the Security Council is 
long overdue, considering that Japan is the second largest contributor.”48  Additionally, the 
youth of Japan are also inclined to favor the ascension of Japan to the world’s economic 
stage.  According to Professor Kuniko Inoguchi of Sophia University;  
“Many younger Japanese brought up in economic prosperity do believe that 
Japan is ready to play an active role in world affairs, especially through the 
United Nations to which Japan pays a lot of money”.49 
 
Outside of Japan, observers have noted the “United Nations payments as impetus” rationale 
for Japan’s bid.  Brad Glosserman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies stated 
of Japan’s UN role; 
Japan provides too much money to the UN for it not to have a real voice…the 
[Security Council] is the only place that voice is not heard. Japanese 
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diplomats chafe when they are not privy to those discussions. They feel they 
have a right to be there, they may be right. 50 
 
The Japanese government has been accused of using its immense payment scale to the United 
Nations as leverage in driving for a permanent seat.  In 2005 Prime Minister Koizumi 
announced that Japanese citizens pressured his government to scale back funding to the 
United Nations because they did not feel they were getting their money’s worth.  Critics 
contended this was a political move designed to show Japan’s displeasure at having never 
attained a permanent seat on the Security Council.51 
If we delve further into Japan’s financing of the United Nations, the Peacekeeping 
Operations budget shows itself to be an interesting indicator of a financial foundation for 
permanent membership.  The UN Peacekeeping Budget, while separate from the regular 
operating budget, follows a similar funding assessment formula with an extremely important 
difference, it is weighted toward permanent members.  It is assumed that since PKO’s require 
the support of all permanent members, they should bear the brunt of the dues necessary to 
fund them.  A very low cap is placed on the poorest nations, while the permanent members 
are assessed at a higher rate similar to the regular operating budget.52 
Even with assessments weighted towards the permanent members of the Security 
Council, Japan once again is assessed the second highest overall payments.  Of the top ten 
highest contributors to the special peacekeeping budget, the United Kingdom placed fourth, 
France fifth, China seventh, and Russia not at all.53 
Another element of Japan’s contributions to the world that officials trumpet when 
speaking of their grand ambition is in the area of Official Developmental Assistance (ODA) 
through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  Prime 
Minister Koizumi put it succinctly when he stated;  
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After the Second World War, Japan experienced a dramatic economic 
recovery, with the help of the international community.  On the basis of our 
own experience, we are keenly aware that, in promoting international 
cooperation, self-help efforts are essential to overcoming difficulties and 
achieving a prosperous society.  Japan’s official developmental assistance 
therefore has been based on the principle of “ownership and partnership.”54 
 
 In 2005, following the familiar pattern, Japan was second behind only the United 
States in total ODA grants and loans.  According to the OECD, in that year Japan donated 
$13 billion to not only East Asia but around the world.  Of the permanent membership of the 
UN Security Council, the United States donated $27 billion, firmly in first place; the United 
Kingdom donated $10.77 billion, in third place; followed by France in fifth with $10 
billion.55 
It is interesting to note that China has received ODA from Japan for many years, a 
fact which will be further elucidated upon later in this analysis.  In economic terms, though, 
sending ODA to a country with which Japan has had such historically antagonistic relations 
is interesting.  According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, China received ¥5.85 
billion in 2007 to finance “The Project for Human Resource Development”.56  In 2006 China 
received ¥16.14 billion in aid,57 ¥10.45 in 2005,58 and ¥23.44 in 2004.59  Yet China remains 
opposed to Japan’s bid for permanent membership. 
The financial basis of Japan’s bid is not, of course, limited to arguments founded on 
UN payments or voluntary contributions.  Since assessments by the UN are a function of 
economic performance, however, those payments and percentages tell a great deal about 
what kind of state Japan is, and its potential for future advancement and leadership on the 
world stage.   
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3.2 Japan’s Political and Military Situation 
 
 Japan has for almost six decades been locked with a Constitution not of their own 
choosing, but one which the population overwhelmingly supports.  After Japan surrendered 
to the Allied Powers following World War II, the United States, through the Supreme 
Commander of Allied Powers, began reconstructing Japanese society in its own image.   
The new Constitution established a bicameral parliament, or Diet, composed of a House of 
Representatives and a House of Councilors.  The chief executive would be a Prime Minister, 
chosen from among the members of the houses. The Emperor was relegated to purely 
ceremonial status.  He would reign but not rule.   
From that point on Japan would be a pacifistic state that would never again use nor 
never again have need of military forces for the resolution of conflicts or the attainment of 
state goals.  It seemed that with the end of the Pacific War the Japanese had “learned their 
lesson” about the horrors of war and would never again support military action or even the 
idea of standing military forces.  The security of the nation would be guaranteed by the 
United States, and the new United Nations. 
 Unfortunately for Japan, permanent members of the Security Council are the final 
arbiters of the use of force under the United Nations’ framework.  Permanent Members are 
not only required to sit in judgment of the relative merits of the use in force in given 
situations, but are also supposed to contribute money, supplies, and troops to carry out the 
orders of the council.  For the other permanent members, this is not a problem.  For Japan, 
such responsibilities would violate six decades of the national character, a national ideology 
built upon the two paragraphs of Article Nine. 
Article Nine, as well as the constitution and the government as a whole, was designed 
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by the United States after the failure of the Japanese establishment to return a Constitution 
that suited the occupation authorities.  The Constitution has put serious limits on the ability 
of the Japanese to maintain military forces and to project force in pursuit of national goals, 
leading to criticism of Japan’s ability to meet Security Council obligations. “Permanent 
members are not supposed to flinch from overseas combat,” says Jamie Miyazaki writing in 
the Asia Times, “but fight if necessary to maintain international peace and security”.  
Permanent membership implies that the country “is willing and fully able to shoulder all 
responsibilities of members in maintaining international peace and security - that means 
taking part in peacekeeping missions and even military intervention.”60 
Although the United States under the presidency of George W. Bush publicly 
supports Japan’s aspirations for permanent membership,61 there have always been 
reservations.  Former Senator William Roth of Delaware sponsored a resolution in the Senate 
stating the sense of the United States Congress that the government “should support 
…Japanese permanent membership” but that Japan should not be permitted to join the 
Security Council as a permanent member unless it resolves issues relating to the use of 
force.62 Speaking on the floor of the US Senate, Senators Roth and Kent Conrad of North 
Dakota inserted into the record the following statement; 
Until…Japanese political leaders are willing to confront this issue 
squarely (and for Japan, which has failed to come to terms with its 
wartime record, this will involve not only domestic debate, but close 
consultation with the country's Asian neighbors) [the] country will be 
able to participate in the type of peacekeeping operation outlined 
above, just as [it did not participate in] Operations Desert Shield or 
Desert Storm. Until Tokyo resolves this problem, it is difficult to see 
how the government can press for membership in the Security Council, 
particularly since such membership would allow the country to vote in 
favor of U.N. military operations which could endanger the lives of 
American servicemen but in which their own armed forces would play 
no part. [emphasis added] 
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 Here we see the two Senators identifying what will later be termed 
“opposition from responsibility”, as well as identifying and understanding the 
international derision and domestic embarrassment the Japanese government received 
for its “checkbook diplomacy” in the its handling of the Gulf Crisis.  They went on; 
In closing, we must stress that we do strongly support a permanent 
Japanese and German presence, with full voting rights, in the Security 
Council. The exclusion of two such potent nations makes little sense. 
However, the fundamental causes of these exclusions were 
manufactured in [former West German capital] Bonn and Tokyo, not 
in New York. Bonn and Tokyo must now dismantle the obstacles to 
their Security Council membership which they, themselves, have 
manufactured. Then New York should move ahead and welcome both 
nations to full and permanent membership in the United Nations 
Security Council.63 
  
Oddly enough, despite the well-known opposition from the West to Japan joining the 
Security Council as a permanent member because of the pacifist issue, thus far the Japanese 
Government has been unwilling to inextricably tie UN Security Council permanent 
membership with revision of the Constitution.64 
Additionally, according to the Economist magazine, the recent elections of September 
11, 2005 which reelected Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro in a landslide “buried what 
remained of the pacifist left in Japanese politics”.65  That is where Japan finds itself 
politically today, even though Koizumi stood down as Prime Minister, there is still a position 
of “conspicuous agreement between Japan's two major parties, the governing Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), over Japanese 
participation in UN PKOs.”66  Given that Ozawa Ichiro currently leads the opposition 
Democratic Party of Japan in the House of Councilors, and he has demonstrated public 
support for normalization,67 Japan could soon domestically push past this issue. 
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 Japan certainly is not wanting for military spending.  Besides the aforementioned 
mandatory and voluntary payments to the United Nations for peacekeeping and other dues 
directly related to the use of force, Japan spent $46 billion dollars in 2007 on defense alone.  
It is admittedly difficult to compare defense spending by nation because China and Russia do 
not publicly disclose total spending leading experts to be forced to estimate total 
expenditures.  Experts are forced to estimate total expenditures for allied states such as 
France and the United Kingdom as well, often from previous years.  The Central Intelligence 
Agency estimates that for the 2007 budget year Japan spent less than China, at $81.47 
billion; the United Kingdom, at $67.5 billion; and France, at $61 billion.  Japan spent more 
than Russia, which the CIA estimates spent $21 billion on defense in 2007.68   
 In a broader scope, Japan’s contribution to the total collective defense budget of US 
allies in East Asia was more than half.  If Japan’s defense budget is compared against that of 
the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan’s budget is 15% 
of their 2007 total of $297.14 billion.  If the top three members of NATO Europe, the 
permanent members France and the United Kingdom and the normalized German military, 
then the total defense budget for NATO in Europe drops by more than half, leaving $131.14 
billion.  In this instance, Japan’s lone defense budget is equivalent to 35% of NATO Europe.  
Finally, if Japan is compared to the fifteen nations the Center for Defense Information lists as 
“Countries of Vital Interest to the U.S.”, their combined defense budgets total $25.47 billion, 
slightly more than half of Japan.69 
For a focused example of military disparity in East Asia, take the Republic of Korea 
and Japan as examples.  Both nations rely on the United States for significant areas of their 
defense.  As of September 30, 2006, Japan hosts 33,453 US military personnel and South 
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Korea hosts 29,086.70  South Korea has fully normalized military forces but is allied with the 
United States to deter future North Korea attempts at annexing the South.  In terms of real 
military expenditures, Japan spent nearly double what the Republic of Korea did in 2006, 
though South Korea expended more as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product.  South 
Korea, which faces a hostile North Korea along its only land border and with whom it is still 
technically at war, spent $21 billion on defense, or 2.7% of its GDP.  Japan spent $46 billion, 
or .80% if its GDP, on defense in 2006.71  Basically, that means an island nation which has 
no “military forces” and a Constitution which forbids it from exercising the use of military 
power to solve international disputes spent more than a country with a completely 
normalized military force facing a hostile enemy directly on its northern border.  This also 
demonstrates that Japan’s powerful economy allows it to spend a great deal of money on 
both a small force, thereby ostensibly purchasing high-quality equipment, and also do so at 
under 1% of their GDP. 
Taking comparisons of Japan’s military capability to other nations beyond abstract 
spending totals into more concrete terms shows a similar interesting trend.  By focusing on 
military strength in specific force totals Japan’s aforementioned military capability vis-à-vis 
the permanent members of the Security Council is once again elucidated. 
It is not just in military expenditures that Japan is on par with the other permanent 
members of the UN Security Council.  In terms of standing military forces, that is, active 
troops by nation, we see that Japan has less active forces than four permanent members of the 
Security Council, but more than one permanent member.  Using the most recent data 
available, The People’s Republic of China has approximately 2.25 million standing forces,72 
about double that of the United States with approximately 1.4 million troops.73  India and 
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North Korea round out the spots three and four, respectively, with 1.3 and 1.1 million active 
duty military personnel.74  Russia still maintains a respectable 1 million personnel, but after 
that the numbers drop off sharply.75  France has roughly 361,085 personnel, putting it in 
sixth place.76  In eighth place is Japan with 239,000 active duty forces.77  The United 
Kingdom, with a long tradition of military power, has even less than Japan with only 195,900 
personnel on active duty.78 
According to London’s International Center for Strategic Studies, in 2005 Japan had 
sixteen attack submarines, fifty-three major surface warships, three hundred combat aircraft, 
and ninety attack helicopters.  Compared with the resources of the United States, this is quite 
low, compared with the resources of the permanent membership of the Security Council, this 
is either equivalent, or quite high.79 
The United Kingdom has a long and rich history of seaborne military power, the 
British Navy long being a symbol of the empire itself.  Even so, the United Kingdom has 
fewer major surface warships than Japan, thirty four, nineteen fewer than Japan.  It has 
eleven attack submarines, five fewer.  It does exceed Japan in the number of attack 
helicopters and combat aircraft, 126 and 354, respectively.  The People’s Republic of China 
is in a similar situation.  China far outpaces Japan in terms of its rapidly modernizing Air 
Force, which possesses a staggering 2,643 combat aircraft to Japan’s 300.  Granted, this does 
not take into account technology, Japan being on the cutting edge, but China has undergone 
major advancements itself in air power.  China also exceeds Japan on two other force totals, 
possessing nineteen more guided missile destroyers and fifty-two more attack submarines.  
Japan’s closest neighbor in terms of military power is France, which possesses two attack 
helicopters, 319 combat aircraft, thirty-four major surface warships, and six attack 
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submarines.  If one looks back at the totals, France possesses eighty-eight fewer helicopters, 
nineteen more combat aircraft, the same number of major surface warships, and five fewer 
attack submarines.80 
 What this means for Japan is that even as a nation without a military, it still has more 
personnel in, and spends more on, it’s non-military in name only “Self-Defense Forces” than 
most every other nation.  In many cases, as documented above, it does so more than 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.  There is something else here 
worthy to note, Japan recently joined the exclusive club of aircraft carrier nations.  On 23 
August 2007 the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces launched the Hyuga, a 13,500 
metric ton displacement aircraft carrier outfitted with the Aegis air-defense system, 2 
Phalanx Close-in Weapons System (CIWS) cannons, 64 advanced RIM-162 ESSM Sparrow 
Missiles and 6 anti-submarine torpedo tubes.  It has the capability, with a flushed flight deck, 
runway design and large hangar bay, to accommodate more than the attack helicopters the 
Japanese government insists it was designed for.  The Japanese government, in fact, classifies 
it as a “helicopter-carrying destroyer” although by the appearance, classification and 
capabilities listed it is most certainly not a destroyer in any classical definition of the term.81 
The Hyuga is also the largest craft launched by the Japanese since the end of the Second 
World War, and places the country’s non-military in an exclusive club with the United States, 
Great Britain, France and India, among few others, as a nation operating the gigantic 
warships. 
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3.3 Recent Developments 
 
 There have been some positive developments on Japan’s road to military 
normalization.  The Defense Agency, which succeeded the wartime Ministries of the Navy 
and the Army, was not treated as a cabinet ministry for constitutional purposes in keeping 
with Article Nine.82  However, on 9 January 2007 the Diet authorized the transformation of 
the Defense Agency into a full-fledged Cabinet Ministry of Defense.83  This allows the 
representatives of the Ministry to receive equal status with their foreign counterparts, as well 
as allowing them to attend regular meetings of the Cabinet within the confines of the 
Constitution and the laws.  Among other developments, in 2006 Japan launched its own spy 
satellites.  More interestingly, Japan openly now states that it considers the independence and 
security of Taiwan to be in its common interest with the United States, and the United States 
has a treaty with the island guaranteeing its security against the mainland, security which “a 
senior American official admits…could not be accomplished without using bases in Japan”.84 
 There have also been proposals for altering Article Nine from various sources, 
ranging from outright abolishment to moderate revision.  In his thorough tract on the need to 
rebuild Japanese politics, Ozawa Ichiro discussed the confusion surrounding how to interpret 
the article in light of Japan’s desire to participate in Peacekeeping Operations, or how the 
Constitution would allow Japan to respond in an emergency situation.  Ozawa argued “we 
find ourselves forever mired in arguments about constitutional interpretation” because “the 
current constitution does not…give us clear guidelines governing Japan’s response to 
international developments”.  To rectify this Ozawa proposed a third paragraph to Article 
Nine which would read; 
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“Paragraph 2 should not be interpreted as prohibiting the maintenance of a 
Self-Defense Force for peace-building activities; the maintenance of a United 
Nations reserve force for actions under United Nations command when 
requested; and action by the United Nations reserve force under United 
Nations command”.85 
 
 The daily Yomiuri, a widely-read national newspaper in Japan, published their 
recommendations for amending Article Nine.  In response to the Gulf crisis, discussed in the 
third section, the editorial staff of the daily Yomiuri proposed the following; 
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people shall never recognize was as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat of force as means of settling international disputes. 
Seeking to eliminate from the world inhuman and indiscriminate weapons of 
mass destruction, Japan shall not manufacture, possess, or use such weapons. 
Japan shall form an organization for self-defense to secure its peace and 
independence and to maintain its safety. 
The Prime Minister shall exercise supreme command authority over the 
organization for self-defense. 
The people shall not be forced to participate in organizations for self-
defense.86 
 
 This draft proposal, which did not become reality, sought to remedy a few notable 
deficiencies of the present Constitution.  Notably, even with the establishment of the 
Japanese Ministry of Defense, the Constitution does not establish the Prime Minister as 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.  In fact, the last Japanese Constitution to do so 
was the Constitution of the Empire of Japan which invested in the Emperor the right of 
supreme command.  Secondly, this draft sought to permanently prohibit compulsory military 
service and all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.  Finally, this draft sought to end 
the ambiguous nature of the Self-Defense Forces under Japanese law, which has been a point 
of contention in the past with other political parties in Japan.87 
This may soon be a non-issue, as recent polls show that a majority of the Japanese 
public supports Japan “normalizing” its military forces, although they are unsure of what 
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form this should take.  There is strong support nationally for officially recognizing the 
existence of the Self-Defense Forces, “an organization that protects the nation yet is not 
mentioned in the supreme law”.  In a public opinion poll conducted by the national Daily 
Yomiuri on 11 and 12th March of 2006, seventy-one percent of respondents answered that 
they believe “the Constitution should clarify the existence of the Self-Defense Forces”.88 
This overwhelming support does not extend to the war-renouncing Article Nine.  In 
the same poll, as well as in previous polls, the public is divided.  Among those polled, thirty-
nine percent favored revision, thirty-three percent favored the status quo, and twenty-one 
percent opposed revision.  Article Nine, as discussed in the previous section, has gone 
through several interpretations as history necessitated, and that is important in understanding 
those who answered with their support of the status quo.  Their answer meant “the article 
should be handled as it has been so far”.  In other words, Article Nine should remain 
unaltered, but its interpretation should be malleable to the needs of contemporary necessity.  
Those who supported revision, on the contrary, expressed understanding that there was a 
“limit to interpreting the article and putting it into practice”.  The minority who opposed 
revision also opposed watering down the article “through changing interpretations”.  To put 
this in practical terms, this means that through either overt Constitutional action or subtle 
changes in understanding, seventy-two percent of respondents seem to support some form of 
military normalization.89 
In a more recent poll conducted 17 and 18th March 2007, forty-six percent of 
respondents supported revising the Constitution while thirty-nine percent did not.  It marked 
the fifteenth straight year that a majority of the Japanese public supported amending the 
Constitution to reflect realities “such as contributions to the international community”.  
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When asked about Article Nine directly, the public answered with an even split.  Thirty-six 
percent of respondents answered in support of some sort of revision, “because limits have 
been reached on how interpretations and applications of the article can deal with 
contemporary problems”.  On the other side, thirty-six percent opposed revision because 
“problems should be handled through interpretations and applications of the current 
article”.90 
 Despite the support of a majority of the population for Constitutional revision, by 
design the amendment process in Japan is difficult.  The proposal to clarify the existence of 
the Self-Defense Forces enjoys overwhelming support, seventy-one percent in the Yomiuri 
poll, but it will still need to pass Constitutional muster.  Article Ninety-six requires that an 
amendment pass by a supermajority, or two-thirds, of both houses of the Diet, and then be 
sent via referendum to the people who must pass it by a simple majority of all votes cast.  
Following approval by the people, the amendment is promulgated by the Emperor in the 
name of the people, but he does not have the authority to veto it.91  Since the ratification of 
the Japanese Constitution in 1947, it has never been amended. 
 Were the proposal regarding the Self-Defense Forces to pass the Diet, it looks to be 
popular enough to pass the popular threshold, but it could still become hostage to politics.  
The Japanese public remains dubious about their country’s participation in security actions.  
In a recent survey conducted in 2007, a full fifty percent of respondents answered that it was 
“okay not to exercise the right of collective self-defense [emphasis added]”.92  In a survey 
conducted a year before, forty-four percent stated “the right of collective-defense should not 
be exercised”.93  Back in early 2002, soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United 
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States when then-Prime Minister Koizumi had promised aid to his ally in an unprecedented 
step, thirty-two percent opposed the right of collective self-defense.94 
 Were Japan to try and pass a Constitutional amendment to fundamentally alter or 
abolish Article Nine to ease some of the criticisms it encounters from other states, notably 
those that sit as permanent members on the Security Council, and thereby move closer to 
attaining their long-sought ambition, the most recent polls do not show the public would 
grant them the Constitutional revisions they desire.  There is support for altering Article Nine 
to allow for what would be known as a military in modern understandings.  The difficulty is 
that about half of that support is for structural change and the other half is for change to the 
understanding and interpretation of the article.  It is unlikely that all those who support the 
“revision by interpretation” faction would vote in favor of an amendment, denying them the 
simple majority they would need to meet Constitutional requirements. 
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4.1 Getting a Larger Table 
 
Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, speaking before Georgetown University in 
Washington, DC in 2006, eloquently summed up the views of many of the emerging states 
seeking recognition on the Council when he stated; 
“A Security Council which has France as a permanent member, but not 
Germany; Britain, but not Japan; China, but not India — to say nothing of 
absence of proper representation from Latin America or Africa — cannot be 
legitimate in the modern world''.95 
 
Indeed, in theory there is great support for expanding the Security Council.  In 
practice, however, there has been opposition at every stage from every permanent member.  
This opposition has taken several forms and has accompanying underlying rationales.  As 
mentioned previously, Japan’s aspirations and those of the other nations vying for seats on an 
expanded council are linked and cannot be taken individually in a vacuum.  For that reason, 
the arguments that have arisen against one nation or another, or against reform of the 
Security Council as a whole, are presented here.  Furthermore, since Japan has thus far been 
the focus of this report it would be useful to present some of the other plans that countries 
have presented for expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council, and how 
they have been received.  Finally, should Japan ever achieve its ambition of a permanent seat, 
it would undoubtedly affect the security policy of the body, and the nations which sit within 
it.  Views of such scenarios, both from within and without, will be presented. 
There are two main barriers to Security Council reform, one technical and one 
political.  It should not be read that the political barrier is somehow more important, or the 
technical somehow less, in the overall narrative for Japan.  Rather, it will be shown that both 
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issues must be independently resolved for Japan’s goals to be realized.  The main technical 
issue which any state must face when seeking an enlargement of the Security Council is 
amending the United Nations Charter.  As Japan and Germany have encountered in trying to 
delete the obviously anachronistic “enemy clauses”, this is a very difficult task.  The UN 
Charter lays out the procedure; 
“Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of 
the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the 
members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United 
Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.”96 
 
In general terms, for Japan to ascend to permanent membership, its proposal would have to 
be adopted by two-thirds of the General Assembly, and then two-thirds of the world’s 
member nations would have to sign on using their respective processes.  Finally, all the 
present permanent members would have a great-power veto over the change.  To date, this 
complicated and time-consuming procedure has only been successfully implemented four 
times.  The first being the aforementioned increase in the size of the rotating membership 
from six to ten in 1963 and, in that same year, the expansion of the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven members.97  This was followed ten years 
later by another successful proposal to increase the size of the Economic and Social Council 
yet again from twenty-seven to fifty-four.98  The last successful amendment to the United 
Nations Charter was an amendment to Article 109, which provides for the calling of a 
general meeting for the purposes of proposing amendments to the Charter, as well as the 
present system of ratifying them.99 
The main political problem that has arisen with the plan to enlarge the Security 
Council is the debate over which states should receive the expanded permanent seats.  The 
Page 36 of 73 
 
Anthony W. Holmes  Calling Shotgun 
developing states in the general membership want to get something out of the deal, so to 
speak, before they cast their votes to expand the Council’s membership.  China summarized 
this position when it announced that any expansion of the Council must; 
“Focus on redressing imbalanced regional representation, particularly serious 
inadequacy in the representation of developing states.  It must in no way 
further aggravate such imbalance…therefore, no reform plan that excludes or 
discriminates against developing countries will even be accepted by the 
general membership of the UN, including China”.100 
 
For Japan to ascend to veto-wielding seats at the circular table, then, politics will have to be 
played with the countries that were left out of the room.  In the last decade, several proposals 
have been presented to the United Nations on how best to proceed with making the Security 
Council more equitable and representative of contemporary realities.  The three most well-
known draft proposals were the “Group of Four plus Two”, the “African Union”, and the 
“United for Consensus” drafts. 
 The “Group of Four plus Two” proposal was a plan by the accepted new powers of 
Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil to ascend to permanent membership by supporting two 
new permanent seats for Africa in 2005.  This proposal called for the creation of six new 
permanent non-veto wielding members, plus four new rotating seats, increasing the size of 
the Security Council from fifteen to twenty-five members.101  It was “a desperate attempt to 
secure permanent membership” by agreeing “to forego their right of veto for at least fifteen 
years”.102  The proposal was not successful despite the strong support of the United Kingdom 
and France, but also not due to the strong opposition of China, 103 and was tabled in that 
same year.104  It is certainly interesting to note that the “G4+2” nations thought they could 
pacify opposition by agreeing to waive their veto rights for fifteen years.  As will be 
demonstrated later, controversies surrounding the veto are one of the key elements of the 
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“opposition from efficiency” arguments. 
 A second popular proposal for expansion came from the African Union.  The fifty-
three member AU, composed of every African nation except Morocco105, supported a similar 
plan to the “Group of four” idea except that the new permanent members would have the 
veto from the outset and there would be five new rotating seats, instead of four.  This would 
create a twenty-six member council106.  This proposal was also tabled in 2005. 107 
 The third draft proposal came from the group of nations calling itself “United for 
Consensus”.  This group, led by Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Kenya, Algeria, Italy, Spain, 
Pakistan and the Republic of Korea108, is notable in how it formed in opposition to specific 
regional countries becoming permanent members.  According to Ian Williams, “Argentina 
and Mexico are not sure how a permanent Brazil would represent Latin America; Spain and 
Italy look askance at Germany, and Pakistan and Indonesia fail to see how a permanent India 
represents them”.109  Mindful also of the high level of prestige that permanent membership 
grants, these nations have sought to deny any new nation the prize and restrict permanent 
membership to the present five, instead limiting expansion to a total of twenty two-year 
rotating members eligible for reelection. 110 
4.2 Opposition takes Form 
 
Since the three most well-known and documented plans for Security Council 
enlargement have been presented, the next step for our purposes is to document the three 
main forms of opposition to Security Council enlargement that have been identified and 
categorized by the author.  The first form is opposition to expanding the Security Council by 
adding any member, not just Japan, and will be termed “opposition from efficiency”.  This 
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opposition is not directed at any specific party of nation and is built on various arguments, 
such as the added difficulty in passing resolutions or overcoming the expanded veto.   
The second and third forms of opposition are directed at Japan in particular, but quite 
different in overall scope.  The second category is leveled at Japan for its unique political 
system, including the lack of a standing military and the presence of Article Nine, will be 
termed “opposition from responsibility”.  It is important to note that this opposition may not 
be permanent and could conceivably be surmounted were Japan to overcome the constraints 
of its political system.  The last form of opposition targets Japan specifically for it’s activities 
in World War Two, its perceived inability to “atone” for its past crimes, et cetera.  This will 
be termed “opposition from history”. 
The first identified form of opposition to Security Council enlargement, “Opposition 
from efficiency,” takes a single, basic form.  It is the belief that should the council be 
enlarged with more permanent members its functions would be hampered to the point that it 
would become too difficult for it to operate effectively.  There is also the belief among some 
current permanent members, notably France and England in the past, that the smooth 
functioning of the United Nations Security Council is more important than its makeup being 
representative of the world’s contemporary political, popular, or economic power.  This 
opposition, unlike the type discussed below, is not targeted specifically at Japan but is rather 
applied to all plans for expansion of the Security Council.   
In 1993, the United Kingdom summed up the “opposition from efficiency” position 
quite well when they stated “the first priority must be to safeguard the effective operation of 
the Council and its ability to fulfill its primary responsibilities under the United Nations 
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Charter”.111  France echoed the sentiment when it stated that it saw no real reason to expand 
the Council since;  
“The ten non-permanent members of the Council already ensure an equitable 
geographic representation of member states, and they have contributed to the 
Council’s primary role now at last restored to its previous character”.112 
 
In the end Russia’s position was similar to that of Britain and France, it “emphasized 
improving the Council’s working relationship rather than expanding its membership”113 and 
later stated that they did not want the Security Council to become a “discussion club”.114  
James Paul and Celine Nahory, writing for the Global Policy Forum, argue that expansion of 
the Security Council’s permanent membership would “exclude virtually all topics from the 
Council’s agenda” therefore “making effective Council action all but impossible”.115 
In the end, once the United States signed on to supporting Japan’s bid, and made 
assurances that there would be no change in the status of the current permanent five members, 
Britain and France softened their opposition and began to accept the prospect of adding Japan, 
as well as Germany.116 
 The United States has publicly supported Japan’s aspirations under the 
administrations of both Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush.  In June 1993 the United 
States announced; 
“The current permanent members of the Council are countries with global and 
economic influence and a capacity as well as a will to contribute to global 
peace and security through peacekeeping and other activities.  Their status on 
the Council should remain unaltered.  The United States supports permanent 
membership for Japan…fully recognizing that that permanent membership 
entails assuming an active role in global peace and security initiatives.”117 
 
The last part of the quote above is vital to understanding “opposition from 
responsibility”, and appears multiple times in statements regarding Japan’s political situation.  
Staying in the United States, former Senator William Roth of Delaware presents an erudite 
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commentary.  The Senator sponsored a resolution in the Senate stating the sense of Congress 
that the government “should support…Japanese permanent membership” but that Japan 
should not be permitted to join the Security Council as a permanent member unless it 
resolves issues relating to the use of force.118  The aforementioned statement by Senators 
Roth and Conrad are vital to understanding this. 
Miyazaki echoed that sentiment by stating “Permanent members are not supposed to 
flinch from overseas combat, but fight if necessary to maintain international peace and 
security”.  Furthermore, permanent membership implies that the country “is willing and fully 
able to shoulder all responsibilities of members in maintaining international peace and 
security – that means taking part in peacekeeping missions and even military 
intervention”.119  In 1993 British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stated that British support 
for permanent membership could only come when Japan had fully embraced Peacekeeping 
Operations.120  The next year Alain Juppe, the French Foreign Minister, agreed with his 
British counterpart when he stated;  
“All those who aspire to be permanent members of the Security Council must 
accept all the obligations as well as the rights.  I am thinking here about 
Peacekeeping Operations”.121 
 
 A subcategory of this “opposition from responsibility” is indeed Japan’s history in 
Peacekeeping Operations.  There are two areas which are worth focusing on here.  One is 
Japan’s domestic situation caused by Article Nine and the mechanisms by which the country 
must operate in order to use its Self-Defense Forces, namely a special authorization by the 
Diet.  Passing a bill in the Diet is a long and involved process, and hinders Japan’s ability to 
quickly respond to crises as they arise.  The second is Japan’s use of its immense economic 
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power as a substitute for personnel and equipment in responding to international situations, 
what has been derisively called “Checkbook diplomacy”.122 
 These issues came to a dual head in the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 when former Iraqi 
Dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and the United States assembled an international 
force to expel him.  The United States requested manpower from Japan123 which Japan was 
unwilling or unable to dispatch.  Japan eventually moved to send forces to support the 
multinational intervention against Iraq, again awakening the decades-old debate on the nature 
of the Self-Defense Forces under Japanese law, but by the time the bill cleared the Diet 
combat operations had ended.  In the end, Japan was humiliated in that although it had 
provided $13 billion dollars to fund the effort124, it was perceived as being stingy since it 
initially only offered $400 million.125  In the end, it was excluded from a list of supporters in 
a full-page ad taken out by the Kuwaiti Government thanking those nations which had 
worked to free it.126  The Japanese public felt equally frustrated, and pressed the government 
for a resolution.127  In the end, the only military manpower Japan sent to Iraq was a fleet of 
minesweepers in June of 1991.128 
 After the Gulf War diplomatic fiasco, Japan moved toward revising the rules of 
operation for the SDF to allow it to be used in United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations.  
Again, Article Nine reared its head as a potential stumbling block.  Cooney tells us that in 
order to use the SDF overseas and still remain within the boundaries of the present political 
interpretation of Article Nine, the force could only be used in instances where the threat of 
force was non-existent, or at least so minimal that SDF forces would not be in imminent 
danger.  In the eventual PKO bill that became law five standards were laid down as 
prerequisites for the use of SDF.  They are: 
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1. Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties in 
the conflict 
2. The parties to the conflict…shall have given their consent to the 
deployment of peace-keeping forces and Japan’s participation in such 
forces 
3. The peace-keeping forces shall retain strict impartiality 
4. Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to be satisfied, the 
Government of Japan may withdraw its contingent 
5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimal necessary to protect 
personnel’s lives, etc.129 
 
Such guidelines are self-evidently restrictive, and the author suggests that they are so 
restrictive as to make Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations tenuous and prone to 
unreliability in the event that actual conflict arises in the event that the ceasefire breaks down.  
Such guidelines would appear to limit Japan to an observer role only, making their numbers 
pointless to maintaining peace and security as any breach of the peace would necessitate their 
immediate withdrawal.  Under these guidelines, Japanese participation in PKO’s would be 
symbolic only.  For example, in July of 2003 the Diet authorized the dispatch of the Self-
Defense Forces to Iraq for humanitarian assistance operations130, where they operated in 
Samawa in the southern part of the country doing non-military activities like road-repair 
work.131  By June 20, 2006 the government had decided to end the deployment with the 
transfer of security in region to the new Iraqi government.132  While this deployment as a 
whole was monumental for post-war Japan, one analyst noted that “the 600 [Japanese SDF] 
troops there” were “embarrassingly constrained in their actions” and were “in effect, 
protected by Australian peacekeepers nearby”133 in keeping with the abovementioned 
principles. 
These restrictive guidelines could have been predicted by any seasoned political 
observer with knowledge of the system within Nagata-chō, and are also a compelling 
component of the opposition from responsibility argument.  Lawmaking in Japan is 
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noticeably different from parliamentary systems in the rest of the world, especially systems 
with which the West would be most familiar, mainly the British Westminster System.  Most 
importantly, unlike the British model of a strong, central Cabinet with a supreme executive 
who presides and guides the government through his union with the legislative branch, 
allowing him or her to act as head of government and party head simultaneously to quickly 
and efficiently manage the affairs of state with little or no input from the minority, especially 
if the party in power holds an absolute majority of seats, the Japanese system presents a stark 
contrast.  A system some have struggled to define.  A system some have labeled a 
“bureaucratic polity”.134 
One of the key criticisms of Japanese policy making is the marked propensity for 
diffusion of responsibility.  Ozawa Ichiro, a former member of the long-ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) in the House of Representatives and now leader of the opposition 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the House of Councilors described it thusly; 
“The government…is itself scattered among many institutions and interests.  
Its ministries and agencies are discrete entities.  No overarching institution 
exists to coordinate and control the whole.  The cabinet, of course, technically 
plays this role, but it has never actually been expected to do so and has 
therefore never developed the necessary procedures.  Put another way, the 
hands and feet of the political structure were created, but the “brain” to govern 
them was not. 
Numerous problems result.  The cabinet meeting, for example, nominally 
Japan’s supreme decision-making body, is an empty institution.  Substantive 
debate does not take place.  “Final decisions” are made in advance, and the 
cabinet meeting is reduced to mere ritual. 
In point of fact, it is not entirely clear just where decisions are made…policy, 
in other words, is decided without anyone’s taking responsibility for it”.135 
 
 Stockwin echoed this sentiment, albeit more diplomatically, when he stated; 
“whereas in the classic case the Westminster model was been found to be 
compatible with a dominant prime minister…very broadly speaking it seems 
reasonable to describe Japanese prime ministers as ranging between weak and 
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moderately effective.  Moreover, the Japanese Cabinet has not been the 
central locus decision making that one would expect”.136 
 
The bureaucratic nature of Japan’s government has been noted previously, but 
deserves special elaboration here.  Japan is a constitutional republic, but the strong influence 
of the bureaucracy in decision-making, to the point of the ministries’ bureaucrats authoring 
and vetting legislation, has led some scholars to struggle to classify the system under which 
the country operates.  For example, when Cabinet Ministers answer questions before the Diet 
it is the rule rather than the exception for them to read their responses verbatim from an 
answer sheet prepared by ministry bureaucrats who received the questions beforehand and 
prepared the appropriate responses, all the while accompanied by a seasoned high-level 
ministry bureaucrat who can take over the for the Diet member in the event they are asked 
anything about their ministry portfolio beyond their expected limited knowledge.137 
As Stockwin explains, at the end of the Second World War the general disdain in 
which the military was held, and the manner in which the bureaucracy survived intact to aid 
in reconstruction by the occupation forces, served to elevate the civilian bureaucracy to 
newfound prestige.  Coupled with new powers granted by the sovereign government 
following the restoration, the bureaucracy became the elite of the new Japan.  Bureaucrats 
were, and still are, a “carefully selected, highly educated elite”138 who are viewed as 
“superior to politicians”.139  It is no surprise then that the bureaucracy became major players 
in a legislative system of diffused powers and responsibilities.   
Recently Japan has been involved in another internal division over use of the SDF 
overseas.  As of this writing, there is “divided government”140 in Japanese politics as the 
House of Representatives is controlled by the Liberal Democratic Party and the House of 
Councilors is controlled by the opposition Democratic Party.  Under a law which expired on 
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1 November 2007 the Maritime SDF was refueling allied vessels en route to support the 
multi-national force in Afghanistan.141  The opposition Democratic Party in the House of 
Councilors has succeeded in preventing a reauthorization of the bill leading the MSDF 
contingent to be withdrawn.142  Such domestic unreliability is undoubtedly a hindrance to 
Japan’s aspirations and further underscores the existence of the “opposition from reliability” 
doctrine. 
 The final form of opposition identified and expounded upon here as it relates to Japan 
and the expansion of the Security Council is the “Opposition from History” problem.  As 
previously mentioned, this is the criticism that Japan receives from her Asian neighbors, for 
her perceived inability to properly atone for her militarist past.  China and the two Koreas are 
very vocal opponents of Japan’s bid.  China, of course, possesses a veto over any changes to 
the United Nations Charter.  As such, Japan must pay careful heed to what direction the 
political winds are blowing in Beijing. 
 That wind, unfortunately for Japan, will not take a clear direction.  China has stated 
that it is “understanding of Japan’s wishes” but “showed no change in its position” on 
whether or not to support Japan.  China will not state outright that it will support or block any 
proposals in the UN, up to and including use of the veto power.143  It is mostly understood, 
though, that China opposes Japan’s aspirations144 and it is entirely feasible that China would 
use the veto to block any change in the UN Charter that would jeopardize its place as the sole 
Asian state with permanent membership and the supremacy that brings.  The Chinese public 
has made its opinion on the matter known as well.  According to the Economist, a petition of 
24 million Chinese was signed in the spring of 2005 opposing Japan’s bid for a permanent 
seat.145 
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 China has frequently used militarist imagery in both domestic and international 
explanations of their opposition.  For example, very early on in Japan’s internal debate over 
how to properly participate in Peacekeeping Operations under the United Nations banner, 
China quickly censured the idea as a “design for resurgent Japanese militarism”.146  Another 
very common theme of Chinese opposition is that Japan is too close to the United States in 
political, economic, and security arrangements to be a truly independent seat on the Council.  
As such, China might say, giving Japan a permanent seat would be akin to giving the USS 
Ronald Reagan one in former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s famous pledge 
to turn his country into an “unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Pacific”.147 
 A 2004 editorial in the state-controlled People’s Daily opined; 
“If an obsequious country dancing to the US' tune becomes a permanent 
member it is not different from giving the US two seats.  In terms of being 
representative India and Indonesia in Asia and several countries in continental 
Africa are obviously more qualified than Japan.  Even Germany is more 
qualified than Japan in terms of morality and justice and human concept”.148 
 
Touching upon the familiar criticism that Japan has yet to face up to his past, the editorial 
continued; 
“The Japanese militarism [sic] committed monstrous crimes on Asian peoples 
during WWII and brought tremendous suffering to the Asian peoples, which is 
a historical fact that no one can write off.  However instead of self-
examination the Japanese Rightist forces are attempting to tamper with and 
delete this part of [their] bloody invasion history.  The Japanese Prime 
Minister, Cabinet members, parliament members and ordinary politicians keep 
on creating troubles on questions such as the invasion history and the 
Yasukuni Shrine, preaching and advocating [a] false historical outlook…This 
standing-facts-on-their-heads and confusing-right-and-wrong behavior 
tremendously hurt the feeling of Asian peoples and of course [was] met with 
the resolute opposition from righteous and peace-loving countries worldwide 
[sic et al]”.149 
 
 Soon after the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the United States Prime Minister 
Koizumi met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin over the Prime Minister’s plan to support 
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the US with SDF contingents against international terrorism.  To his admitted surprise the 
meeting was “extremely positive” and “very open and relaxed”.  Koizumi explained that “the 
SDF's activities will be restricted to provide relief and medical care to refugees as well as 
giving logistic support to U.S. forces in their war against terrorism”.  Jiang responded "That 
kind of support operation is easier to accept" than use of the SDF for military purposes, but 
then rejoined “I want you to remember that Asian people are wary [of an expanded military 
role for Japan]".  At an earlier conference with Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, Koizumi was 
told "I want Japan to be careful about expanding the SDF's role" because of slippery-slope 
fears that Japan would use strikes on Afghanistan to accelerate its deployments of the 
SDF.150 
Unlike China, the Republic of Korea has been very forthcoming officially in its 
opposition to Japan’s desires.  According to Ambassador Kim Sam Hoon, quoted by the 
Korean Yonhap News Agency, “we do not think Japan has the qualifications necessary to 
become a UN Security Council member, and we will try to make sure that it does not 
[become one].”  He added “there are difficulties for a country that does not have the trust of 
its neighboring countries because of its lack of reflection on the past to play the role of a 
world leader”.151 
 Japan and the Republic of Korea have had a recent dispute that aptly illustrates this 
lack of trust, and how even what would seem a minor disagreement to an outside observer 
must be viewed in light of regional animosity.  This also provides a case-study for our 
purposes.  There are two islets known by three different names, highlighting the delicacy of 
the situation, disputed fiercely by Japan and the Republic of Korea.  Known as Takeshima 
(“Bamboo islands”) by the Japanese, Dokdo (“Solitary Islands”) by the Koreans, and 
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Liancourt or Hornet Rocks by the West, they have been a focal point of renewed national 
outrage.  Situated in the Sea of Japan (unless you are Korean, in which case they are situated 
in the Eastern Sea) roughly equidistant at 133 miles (215 kilometers) from the mainland of 
the Republic of Korea, and 131 miles (211 kilometers) from Shimane Prefecture on the 
Japanese mainland152, both countries claim them as part of their sovereign territory.  The 
roots of these claims are worth understanding, and basically it stems from history.  As Koichi 
Kosuge explains writing for the Asahi Shimbun, in 1946 the General Headquarters that 
administered Japan following its defeat removed Japan’s authority over the islets but did not 
include them in the San Francisco Peace Treaty as areas to which Japan renounced all claims, 
such as Korea and Taiwan.  As such Syngman Rhee, President of South Korea at the time, 
drew a now famous line bringing the islands within his country’s control a year later in 
1952.153  Both countries claim ancient use of the islets for fishing and stopovers, and to have 
discovered them first.154  The most important issue may be that Japan first incorporated the 
islands into their territory during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, the same year that Japan 
began the annexation of Korea that would be fully completed five years later with the Japan-
Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910.155 
 The modern incarnation of the dispute stems from an incident in April of 2006 when 
the Japanese Government ordered the Coast Guard to dispatched two unarmed vessels, the 
Meiyo and the Kaiyo, to map the seabed around the islets before an international conference 
at which South Korea was to propose Korean names for some underwater features.  The 
Republic of Korea, outraged, dispatched two armed naval vessels to the same area.  Japanese 
officials offered to meet for a diplomatic conference, but were immediately rebuffed.  Soon 
after, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun went on national television and explained to 
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the nation that "Japan's present claim to Dokdo is an act of negating the complete liberation 
and independence of Korea...no compromise or surrender is possible, whatever the costs and 
sacrifices may be".  Eventually a deal was reached between the two governments whereby 
Japan withdrew its surveyors in exchange for South Korea withdrawing its proposed names 
for the features at the hydrographical conference.156 
 Though the People’s Republic of China and South Korea have stated their opposition 
to Japan’s end goals, not every nation in Asia has expressed similar attitudes.  In September 
of 2005 the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), a supranational body which 
promotes “economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region”157 and 
includes Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam as members,158 announced that it would officially support Japan’s 
bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat, though it remained quiet on supporting any of 
the other announced candidates, stating that “supporting Japan and supporting [other 
aspirants] are different [matters]”.159 
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5.0 Conclusions 
 
 What has been presented here is an analysis of the history and politics of Japan’s 
rationale for a permanent United Nations Security Council seat and what has informed that 
ambition.  Additionally, opposition to Japan’s bid from three different viewpoints was 
discussed.  These views are the most important stumbling block to Japan’s ascension to the 
Council. 
 In the beginning it was seen that many in Japan were not sure whether it should be a 
member of the United Nations at all, a far cry from where it now stands as a seeker of 
permanent membership.  Since that time Japan has developed what the Japanese themselves 
call a “UN-centric” diplomacy which prizes cooperation and subordination to the world body 
in international disputes.  Given that Japan places such high priority on UN cooperation, it is 
no surprise that Japan seeks such an unambiguous position of power within it.   
Is Japan’s ambition for a permanent position on the Security Council, a driving force 
since the early stages of the restoration of Japanese sovereignty, a drive for self-
determination in military matters?  There is certainly a realist element to their pursuit.  
Deference to the UN is an article of faith in Japanese politics, and high-level politicians have 
gone so far as to say that only UN-sponsored force is legitimate.  Ozawa Ichiro did so when 
he explained his rationale for making the Self-Defense Forces completely and totally 
subordinated to United Nations control.  A permanent Japanese position on the Security 
Council would allow Japan to hold both positions simultaneously – a nation with sovereign 
command over its own defense forces through its position on the Council on one hand, and a 
nation utterly deferential to United Nations control on the other.  The former would allow 
Japan to sidestep the difficult and politically inconvenient issue of amending Article Nine, 
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and the latter would allow it to remain true in spirit to its long post-war history. 
As speeches and writings from major political figures such as Prime Ministers Kishi 
and Nakasone show, Japan did not wait long before it attempted to reassert itself on the 
world stage.  Kishi in reevaluating the limitations of Article Nine, and Nakasone pushing the 
Foreign Ministry to begin working to delete the enemy clause as a stepping stone to 
permanent membership.  The existence of the enemy clauses to this day underscores the 
difficulty in amending the UN Charter, a necessary step to both deleting the enemy clauses 
and changing the composition of the permanent members of the Council.  The fact that the 
present Charter contains references to the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” as well as 
Republican China shows that both countries are more comfortable with a fait accompli than 
with expending the international political capital necessary to enshrine their current statuses 
within the Charter.  Japan, on the other hand, is in it for the long haul and seems to be willing 
to “wait it out” for the rest of the membership to come into line with their ambitions and to 
expend both political and financial capital to buy the support they need.   
 Japan has undertaken humanitarian aid and other efforts in Iraq and logistical support 
in Afghanistan in the aid of the United States and the coalition forces involved there.  In the 
case of Iraq Japan provided assistance without a direct UN mandate, a major step away from 
Japan’s pacifist historical conditioning.  It seems that former Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
efforts to reshape Japan’s military and regional role will continue with limited opposition 
domestically, but with cautious, and often dubious, attention from her regional rivals.  Recent 
election results have been taken to show that the Japanese public supports plans to 
“normalize” Japan both militarily and internationally, as both parties in power support 
eventual normalization of the country’s military situation.  A successful revision of Japan’s 
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Constitution would undoubtedly ease some of the tension the Western powers have towards 
Japan’s ability to fulfill United Nations Security Council commitments.  These activities can 
help reduce some of the anxiety the parties that hold to the “opposition from reliability” 
problem experience, but the future of that remains to be seen.  In many eyes, regardless of 
Japan’s military or economic capability, its potential remains stagnant so long as it is 
hindered by domestic constitutional constraints.  Contrarily, however, those same 
constitutional constraints that hinder Japan’s ambitions also pacify the concerns Japan’s 
regional neighbors have towards a rearmed, remilitarized former aggressor. 
Economically, Japan has a strong case for its bid for a permanent seat.  Japan is the 
world’s second largest economy and a major contributor to the United Nations in both the 
general operating budget and for special peacekeeping operation budgets.  Japan’s levies 
from the United Nations surpass all other permanent members of the Security Council except 
the United States.  Many foreign commentators have commented on the fact that Japan is a 
valuable member of the organization but that it seems to be sidelined out of discussions that 
are within its spheres of influence and concern (Security Council meetings over Taiwan, for 
example).  If Japan were to become too frustrated over repeated denials of its ambition, 
would it simply cease playing the game altogether?  This is unlikely.  What is more likely is 
that if Japan is repeatedly rebuffed, by a Chinese veto, for example, it would take its 
influence elsewhere.  It could work toward peddling its considerable resources in regional 
security apparatuses or regional trade deals.  It could likewise shift its attention towards 
gaining positions of prominence in the affairs of regional geopolitical organizations like 
ASEAN.  If Japan is rebuffed after it has proceeded toward military normalization it would 
be in a better position to become involved in regional security frameworks than it is now, 
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operating, by choice, under its UN-centric model.  Another noteworthy possibility is for 
Japan to join with the “Group of Four” nations and apply pressure to the United Nations, be it 
economic, financial, or other.  Japan, Germany, India and Brazil could rephrase the debate in 
the international community in their favor.  Instead of being passive and trying to make their 
respective cases, like this thesis has done in some instances, for a permanent seat they could 
go on the offensive and argue that it is up to the present permanent members and the 
countries trying to deny them a promotion to prove they do not deserve it.  Japan’s immense 
economic, financial, and military power would surely be missed should Japan decide to play 
politics with even a fraction of it. 
 Internationally, Japan has been successful in gaining some support for its permanent 
seat, even support independent of the other countries of the world who are seeking 
concurrent expansion, such as Germany and India.  Japan can count the support, as of this 
writing, of the Association of South East Asian Nations and the United States.  Indicators 
point that the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth would also support Japan’s expansion.  
Much of this support could be because no one actually expects it to happen.  Every proposal 
that has come up to expand the Council has been tabled.  Every regional leader has a regional 
rival.  Japan’s regional rival has a veto. 
 Japan is not, obviously, without hindrances on the road to expansion.  China, 
although not officially, has stated it will oppose any enlargement of the Security Council 
beyond the present membership.  France and the United Kingdom originally opposed any 
enlargement of the Council on the grounds that it would muck up the efficiency of the 
Council’s operations.  As time has passed this “opposition from efficiency” has changed 
form from “any enlargement” to “who should be included?”  Changing the question may be a 
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convenient ruse, designed to allow the competitors to jockey amongst themselves for 
supremacy while the current members wait it out, conscious of the fact that by the time one 
or more of the present contenders is in a position to move forward it has burned too many 
bridges with the regional blocs and allies of its opposition to garner the Charter muster it 
needs to gain permanency on the Security Council. 
 There are also concerns that Japan’s current political activism for expansion is 
unsustainable and will eventually fizzle out by the characteristic seven-year-itch syndrome.  
Right now, for Japan, legitimacy rests with the United Nations but it may not always.  
Although the desire for a permanent seat is there, Japan may be willing to abandon the 
pursuit altogether if a more immediately tenable solution is found.  This is, even by the 
author’s own admission, a long-shot scenario. 
 In the great power game of East Asian regionalism, Japan does not believe it can 
legitimize its regional power without the Security Council, and the People’s Republic of 
China holds the keys, through the veto, to Japan’s ascension.  Unfortunately for Japan, China 
and South Korea adhere to the “opposition from history” argument strongly.  Japan wants to 
adhere to its own version of official history and for China to move on with life, so to speak.  
China wants Japan to publicly fess up for its actions in the war and to make 
acknowledgement of militarist history part of the nation’s core curriculum.  Japan has 
publicly, repeatedly, apologized for its role in Asian militarism but in the eyes of the 
Japanese East Asia always wants more.  China is advancing economically and militarily and 
does not want a confident, powerful Japan next door.  Additionally, the Republic of Korea 
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are uncharacteristically united in their 
opposition to the expansion of the Security Council to include Japan.  South Korea, for its 
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part, has stated it will use its considerable economic and diplomatic leverage to work to make 
sure Japan’s ambitions are left unrealized.  Despite the shared security interests of the two 
countries against China’s designs on Taiwan or North Korea’s continued bellicosity, they 
cannot come to an agreement on official history.  That is the utility of the “opposition from 
history” argument: it is infinitely malleable to the situation at hand, substantively empty, and 
deeply embedded in popular passions.  It is a useful tool for maligning Japan because it 
covers the actual issues with a unified chorus from the continent chanting the historical 
wrongs committed by Japan, furthering the pulpit nation’s goals.  It is the author’s belief that 
China hopes that this tactic holds long enough for their political and military superiority over 
the region to be a certainty.  China’s possession of the veto, gained by bypassing the 
machinery of the United Nations Charter it now stands sentinel over, guarantees Japan will 
not ascend to the Council without a truly odd development in which China sees a confident 
and remilitarized Japan on the international scene as being in their own self-interest. 
 It has been speculated that Japan’s only real hope may be when the great powers 
abandon the veto, allowing the decision to be made solely on the decision of the General 
Assembly’s membership.  The Great Powers will never give up their vetoes, as it was 
designed to keep them at the table of on organization that is often accused, domestically, of 
slowly trying to undermine their sovereignty.  For great powers, the United Nations is more a 
forum to project power, and simultaneously to defend your own, than it is to share in an 
egalitarian assembly.  Japan’s unique history, its utter defeat at the hands of the United States 
in World War II and its reconstruction into a pacifist state, has caused Japan to see the United 
Nations more from the viewpoint of a minor power than from the viewpoint of the world 
power it actually is.  Therefore, Japan will have to convince the present permanent members, 
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most of whom it far exceeds in economic, financial, and military potential, that they have 
more to gain from letting Japan sit with them than they have to lose from denying them a seat 
at the table, playing the game. 
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7.0 Appendix I: Data Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
GDP of the Five Permanent Security Council Members and Japan 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
China 1,931.65 2,243.69 2,644.64 3,248.52 3,713.30 
France 2,061.18 2,137.51 2,252.21 2,515.24 2,656.53 
Japan 4,608.14 4,557.11 4,366.46 4,345.95 4,552.20 
Russia 591.861 764.068 984.925 1,223.74 1,480.18 
United Kingdom 2,169.39 2,246.33 2,398.95 2,755.92 2,933.25 
United States 11,685.93 12,433.93 13,194.70 13,794.22 14,305.70 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2007 
Scale: in Billions of US Dollars, GDP, current prices 
Note: Values after 2006 Estimated by IMF 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
GDP by PPP of the Five Permanent Security Council Members and Japan 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
China 7,768.88 8,853.99 10,147.33 11,606.34 12,988.64
France 1,767.61 1,855.95 1,952.63 2,040.11 2,116.97
Japan 3,747.92 3,942.21 4,155.55 4,346.08 4,494.66
Russia 1,438.40 1,579.91 1,738.98 1,908.74 2,068.08
United Kingdom 1,925.91 2,024.70 2,148.07 2,270.88 2,363.97
United States 11,473.38 12,207.78 12,954.71 13,543.33 14,045.51
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2007 
Scale: in Billions of US Dollars, GDP, valuation of currency 
Note: Values after 2006 Estimated by IMF
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Table 3 
Active Troops by Nations, Top Nine Nations 
 Country Standing Force Totals 
China 2,255,000 
United States 1,415,289 
India 1,325,000 
North Korea (DPRK) 1,106,000 
Russia 1,037,000 
France 361,085 
Germany 284,500 
Japan 239,000 
United Kingdom 187,970 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Multiple, see Citations and Bibliography 
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Table 4 
Top 5 Global Military Spenders 
 United States $518
United Kingdom $81
France $45
China $44
Japan $42
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Marte, Ana and Winslow Wheeler, ed.  CDI Military Almanac 2007 
Scale: Billions of US Dollars 
Note 1: A percentage of Japan’s military spending is used to offset the presence of US forces 
defending Japan under the US-Japan security treaty. 
Note 2: China’s military budget is classified and must be estimated by outside observers. 
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Table 5 
Naval Power of the Five Permanent Security Council Members and Japan 
Nation Aircraft Carriers Combat Aircraft Major Surface 
Warships 
Attack Submarines 
United 
States 
11 3856 118 54 
United 
Kingdom 
2 354 34 11 
Japan 1(see Note) 300 53 16 
France 1 319 34 6 
China 0 2643 63 68 
Russia 1 2118 66 46 
Source: Marte, Ana and Winslow Wheeler, ed.  CDI Military Almanac 2007 
Note: Japan’s “Helicopter carrying destroyer”, the JDS Hyuga, is discussed in Part II 
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8.0 Appendix II: Language Notes 
 
Note A  
Prime Minister Nakasone’s statement that “Japan was the second biggest contributor to the 
UN and therefore had no need to be shy” about its aspirations used the following Japanese 
phrase:「恥ずかしい顔をする必要じゃない」or “hazukashi kao wo suru hitsuyo ja nai” 
which literally translates as “do not need to have a shamed face”.  This translation was done 
by the cited source in the main document. 
 
Note B 
The phrase “Divided Government” when referring to different parties controlling different 
houses of a bicameral legislature is an English expression.  The original Japanese was ｢ねじ
れ国会｣or “nejire kokkai” which literally translates as “twisted Diet”.  This translation was 
the author’s. 
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